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Understanding the Ubiquity of the Intentionality of Consciousness in 
Commonsense and Psychotherapy 
 





A formal and idealised understanding of intentionality as a mental process is a central topic 
within the classical Husserlian phenomenological analysis of consciousness. This paper does not 
define Husserl’s stance, because that has been achieved elsewhere (Kern, 1977, 1986, 1988; Kern 
& Marbach, 2001; Marbach, 1988, 1993, 2005; Owen, 2006; Zahavi, 2003). This paper shows 
how intentionality informs therapy theory and practice. Husserl’s ideas are taken to the 
psychotherapy relationship in order to explain what it means for consciousness to have 
intentionality in various ways. The role of intentionality in psychopathology and its treatment 
within cognitive behavioural therapy is explained as a way of showing how understanding 




From 1913, Edmund Husserl made it clear that 
phenomenology is about the intentionality of 
consciousness. As he put it: “Intentionality is the 
name of the problem encompassed by the whole of 
phenomenology” (Husserl, 1913/1982, p. 349). The 
precise way in which Husserl intended his 
phenomenology of the mental relation to being and 
non-being, belief and non-belief, is that theory should 
be promoted for practices of every kind. The specific 
ways in which Husserl claimed that phenomenology 
could help were: (1) in the creation of a theoretical or 
pure psychology for promoting the practice of any 
applied psychology (Husserl, 1928/1997), and (2) in 
creating a pure phenomenological philosophy that 
would justify and promote theory for the sciences and 
applied philosophy in academic disciplines.  
 
The Husserlian definition of intentionality 
specifically infers the donation or interpretation of the 
meaning of an object onto the perceptual sensations 
that are present (Husserl, 1900/1970, p. 860). While 
this notion is central to the argument presented in this 
paper, Husserl exegesis is beyond its intent. The aim 
of this paper is, rather, to show that the original 
domain of phenomenology is understanding the 
conscious objects of qualitative experience in relation 
to how they are conscious, the forms of being-aware, 
the modes of intentionality (Husserl, 1913/1982, pp. 
220-221, 244-245, 251-252). Such understanding 
makes the nature of psychological situations, and 
hence their treatment, clearer. Why intentionality is 
useful is that it accounts for all forms of 
psychological existence, many of which are not 
current but temporal (actively remembered, automatic 
influence of the past, the immediate moment that is 
coming, the anticipation of the future, the imagination 
of something at any time). In essence, understanding 
intentionality is about a fundamental understanding of 
what it is to be in a conscious world with others and 
share meaning experientially.  
 
The level that phenomenology originally addressed 
was not that of higher, derivative claims about the 
justification of natural psychological science and its 
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differentiation into bona fide and pseudo-scientific 
forms (Rorer, 1991). For phenomenology, there is 
primarily a seamless whole of meaning. The ubiquity 
of intentionality is something readily understood by 
clients, and therapists of different schools will grasp 
that what is being discussed is how consciousness can 
turn to the same object and, depending on the 
intentional relation, find different senses of it - as 
intellectually-understood, as emotively-understood, as 
visually-perceived, as remembered. What is being 
called on, as proof of intentionality, is understanding 
one’s own experience and what others tell of theirs. 
The view is pre-scientific. Intentionality exists as 
awareness, behaviour, relating and affect. 
Intentionality is a necessary explanation of the 
commonsense psychological world. In psychology 
and therapy, the understanding of it goes further in 
specifying the details that lay people cannot.  
 
Clinical vignettes will be used to explain the role of 
intentionality in its ability to map changes in forms of 
attention and awareness. This paper does not propose 
new interventions or a new brand name for therapy, 
but argues for a greater awareness about what therapy 
is in the practice of psychosocial skills. What is 
proposed is a needs-led approach to understanding 
the experiential creation of psychological problems in 
terms of intentionality - in order to connect with 
interventions in the same terms. 
 
Identifying Some Forms of Intentionality 
 
This paper concerns the ubiquity of intentionality in 
ordinary living and the theory and practice of 
psychotherapy of any type. This opens the door for 
explanations of the notion as applicable to other areas 
of psychology also. As a concept, intentionality is 
capable of enabling therapists and clients, supervisors 
and researchers, to speak the same language. Because 
intentionality clearly maps first-person experiences of 
seeing, feeling, thinking and behaving, it easily 
performs a mediating role in enabling clients and 
therapists to understand collaboratively the nature of 
psychological problems, and hence to make some 
headway in working to reduce or alter those 
problems. Staying at the level of generality for a 
while longer, intentionality defines the many types of 
relation between consciousness and the meanings of 
beings of all kinds. Specifically, intentionality 
comprises both simple and compound (or composite) 
types and refers to conscious meanings. Its objects 
could be linguistic-conceptual ones or non-verbal 
composite wholes, gestalts of non-linguistic meaning 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Some specific forms of 
intentionality can be listed as follows. 
 
Perceiving concerns the conscious awareness of 
sensations in the five senses about real events in the 
here and now, including how one’s own body feels 
(Marbach, 1993, pp. 51-52). 
 
Imagining concerns envisaging something that might 
or might not happen or exist, at an unspecified time 
(past, present or future), without believing that it is, 
was, or will be, real (Marbach, 1993, p. 75). 
 
Behaviour is most often purposeful action towards a 
desired outcome. The English language sense of the 
word “intentionality” as “purposeful” is not what 
intentionality means in phenomenology. Behaviour 
can vary in its degree of skilfulness and in being 
either fully cognisant, automatic, or a mixture of the 
two. 
 
Affect can be about values but most often represents 
how a self is relating, or has related, to others, and 
how others are relating or have related to self. 
 
Empathy is the socially learned appreciation of the 
perspective of others (Husserl, 1931/1977, pp. 111-
120; Marbach, 1993, p. 91; Owen, 2006, p. 162). In 
that empathy is a complex intentionality involving 
many parameters, a thorough theoretical account of it 
is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Conceptual intentionality is the use of language in 
internal dialogue, discussion with others, reading and 
writing (Marbach, 1993, p. 3). Concepts have a 
general manner of referentiality: they can point either 
to first-hand experiences or to the second-hand, 
empathised experiences of others. Concepts employ 
an abstract manner of giving their meaning: they 
make meanings known often without the object itself 
coming into consciousness. Similarly, believing that 
something is the case can also be expressed in explicit 
speech or internal dialogue. 
 
Nested types of intentionality also occur in 
conjunction with temporality, the many facets of the 
experience of time. These are important perspectives 
for understanding the orientation that clients have 
towards their psychological worlds - for instance, 
remembering what a visual perceiving of a scene was; 
remembering what was said by another and felt and 
thought by oneself (Marbach, 1993, p. 79); anticipa-
ting what will be seen; anticipating what will be said; 
anticipating how one will feel in relation to an 
anticipatory empathising with how another might act. 
 
Finally, there are a host of possibilities for 
psychological experience concerning how others will 
react to self and how self will react because of the 
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reaction of others, plus ever more complex forms of 
these intersubjective situations - for instance, the 
empathic imagining of what someone might think or 
feel at some unspecified point in time. Empathy can 
be connected to imaginatively visualising what self 
and others could do, in the sense of creating an 
imaginary world and feeling emotion in relation to 
the scenes envisaged. 
 
The Role of Theory 
 
The role of theory in psychology and therapy is to 
point to what counts, so that psychological processes 
can be identified, discussed and interpreted in a 
variety of contexts  -  for instance, between clients 
and therapists; for clients and their lives outside of 
sessions; and for trainers and trainees. However, what 
appear are mixed, complex wholes of sense, gestalts, 
which exist in relation to complex composites of 
intentionality.  
 
There are areas of hermeneutics and theory of mind 
that are relevant, but they cannot be fully explained 
within this paper. It must thus suffice, in passing, to 
point to the notion of the self-reflexive appreciation 
of what it is to understand intentionality itself. 
Because intentionality is closely tied to the conscious, 
it might be easy to forget the social dimension of life, 
but clearly this would be non-phenomenological (as 
well as non-psychological, non-empathic and non-
inter-subjective). In brief, what is broached here is: 
(1) the intentionality of a person in relation to 
psychological experiences and other people generally, 
and (2) the reminder that intentionality is interpreted 
from complex wholes of what appears.  
 
This paper argues for understanding the ubiquity of 
intentionality in psychopathology and therapy 
practice. The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the 
limits of therapy theory and practice: that what is 
being dealt with are conscious skills, directed towards 
conscious aims and encouraging free will to alter the 
use of intentionalities and their associated meanings. 
Having a better understanding sharpens practice by 
enabling a clearer grasp of what change is, in terms of 
the progression from problems to answers. It is 
claimed that intentionality is the key for unlocking the 
abilities of clients to self-help, whilst helping 
therapists know what their role is in helping clients. 
 
Intentionality, as the interpretation of conscious 
experience, makes it clear how to position oneself in 
order to help clients act and interpret in specific ways. 
Some of the outcomes for sessions are to motivate 
and inform clients and help them to advise themselves 
- for instance, by helping them act on their own 
behalf to reduce binge-eating because they know that 
binge-eating has no overall benefit for them. 
 
The force of intentionality is illustrated by the 
following example. A traumatised and agoraphobic 
client reports his experience that, whilst walking 
down the street in the middle of the day, he saw two 
men running across the road towards him. He 
immediately concluded that they were about to mug 
him, for the third time that year. It was not until he 
realised that they were both wearing tracksuits, and 
had just come out of a sports club, that he understood 
that their intention was jogging and not theft. The 
point is that the forms of intentionality that 
phenomenology claims are interpretations of the way 
in which experiences get superimposed on each other 
in different ways. As Husserl put it: “while I perceive 
my material environment, a flash of memory comes to 
me and I devote myself entirely to it, this world of 
perception does not then disappear; no matter how 
much this world may lose its ‘actuality’, may 
‘withdraw from me’, perceptually it is always there” 
(1939/1973, pp. 175-176). Through mis-empathising, 
this client mis-identified the joggers as muggers on 
the basis of the other attacks he had recently suffered. 
The retained meaning from his previous attacks was 
thus donated to or superimposed on the current 
situation.  
 
Because his previous traumatic experiences led the 
client to be generally paranoid, he empathised a great 
deal of his social experience as people being against 
him and that others have bad intentions. Not only was 
there thus the current perception of the runners, but 
there was a re-connection to the previous intentions 
of his attackers that were added to the current 
moment. However, when he focused more on the 
actuality of the current moment, he realised that he 
had mistakenly empathised the men’s intentions 
towards him. Because the same client frequently 
avoided leaving home altogether, there was also a 
future-orientation in his anticipation of what might 
happen. This client’s affect was such that he preferred 
to stay inside rather than to go out, because he 
anticipated that open spaces, streets, and dark or 
crowded places would have muggers in them. His 
orientation in time, place and person is that he is both 
future- and past-oriented at the same time. His 
orientation in person is fearful in any current 
environment because of his past attacks. In person, he 
continued to experience himself as vulnerable to 
attack and he empathised that others have bad 
intentions towards him and his property. The anxiety 
he felt was intense with respect to what he anticipated 
might happen, so he often chose to stay inside rather 
than to go out. The more he stayed in, the worse his 
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What follows is a note on the different kinds of 
psychological disorder that appear when 
intentionality is taken seriously. This focus gives way 
to understanding how therapy can respond in 
suggesting forms of self-help or making interventions 
in sessions. The claims made have been gained 
through clinical work. Of course, further work needs 
to be done in identifying the precise intentional 
components of any psychological disorder. The 
remainder of the paper is divided into two sections 
dealing with the explanatory power of intentionality 
in psychodynamics and cognitive behavioural therapy 
respectively. Firstly, the psychodynamics of the 
intersubjective relationship in a talking therapy are 
explained via intentionality, in order to show what 
Freud’s basic terms of resistance and transference 
mean. Secondly, the cognitive behavioural therapy 
approach is re-interpreted in terms of intentionality, 
making it clear what is being assumed to be the 
problem and what the nature of therapy should be. 
For the sake of brevity, the paper does not attempt a 
full explanation of Husserl’s view of the 
communalisation of intentionality between people in 
relation to cultural objects (Husserl, 1936/ 1970, 
1931/1977), although his adherence to this latter, co-
empathic and intersubjective view is noted. 
 
How Intentionality Helps Explain Psychodynamics  
 
Freud’s practice revolved around the psychodynamics 
of intersubjectivity in a two-person relationship, but 
was reported through his terminology of unconscious 
communication, resistance, transference and counter-
transference. This brief overview looks at resistance 
and transference in an intentional way. The aim is to 
show how Freud’s practice still has worth today and 
how it can be clarified through understanding 
intentionality. Freud partially showed the phenomena 
of resistance and transference, but he got them caught 
up in forms of explanation that did not permit the 
phenomena to be grasped properly. Ellenberger 
(1970, p. 542) is one who has noted the influence on 
Freud in his youth of Brentano’s earlier version of 
intentionality as “consciousness-of”.  
 
In outline, resistance does not apply only to the form 
of self-disclosure within psychoanalysis, but to self-
disclosure of any type. Self-disclosure is essential to 
all types of therapy and can be best understood as a 
complex interconnection between different types of 
intentionality. Resistance is the sum total of a series 
of anticipated comparisons, that also hold a 
connection to the past. It exists in relation to any 
potential object of speech, in relation to anticipated 
objects of the empathised response of the therapist, 
and in relation to anticipated emotional states of client 
and therapist. Freud’s technique was to monitor the 
amount of resistance occurring and reduce it to enable 
clients to self-disclose sufficiently to get help 
(1914/1958, p. 155, 1940/1964, p. 179). Resistance 
occurs also in relation to clients who want to self-
disclose and get help, through giving of an object of 
their private attention to the public domain in speech. 
Let us deal with resistance first. 
 
Resistance can be seen most clearly in those cases 
where clients have difficulty in attending assessments 
for therapy. Clients who have resistance may wish to 
exert some control of the process of being assessed 
by including third parties to help them with the 
‘ordeal’ that they anticipate will occur in asking for 
help. Once clients with this type of fearfulness finally 
get to meet the therapist, they may further experience 
anticipatory fear that inhibits self-disclosure of their 
story. Resistance can be understood intentionally as a 
composite of a number of intentionalities that 
together explain the gross negative anticipation of 
what will happen. Therefore, resistance supports the 
need to control assessment and therapy, possibly 
giving rise to an ambivalence or a complete inhibition 
in asking for help altogether. Resistance is also 
apparent in those clients who say that they would like 
to have therapy after assessment, but who do not 
come to the first session, or who may drop out after 
attending a small number of sessions. Resistance is 
also what happens when relevant topics for 
discussion are mentioned briefly by clients in passing 
and then are avoided thereafter. The phenomenon of 
resistance is also at play when relevant topics are 
completely omitted by clients.  
 
On gentle inquiry, what appears is that clients fear 
that there will be disapproval from therapists and 
hence a negative change for clients in their feelings 
about themselves. Resistance has consequences for 
some, in that to admit a ‘fault’ or ‘mistake’ would 
make them feel uncomfortable about themselves 
because of some taboo behaviour or some socially 
unacceptable thoughts, impulses, emotions or other 
indiscretion to which they would be admitting. Thus, 
one aspect of the whole of resistance is an anticipated 
empathising that there will be disapproval from 
others. 
 
The point of intentionality, for client and therapist, is 
that it opens up all the parts that comprise the whole 
in intersubjectivity. Any two persons are intertwined 
in such a way that, even in the anticipation of self-
disclosure, anxiety, shame and fear can arise 
sufficiently to inhibit the speaking of the object of 
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consciousness. When the future-orientation of 
resistance is understood, remarks can be made to 
clients to help them self-disclose in a respectful 
manner, at their own pace and in their own way. 
Although not every aspect of conscious 
communication is continuously conscious, all 
potentially conscious aspects can come to 
consciousness from time to time. 
 
Similarly, the nature of what is called transference, 
according to Freud, is disputed when therapists pay 
close attention to whom the inaccurate empathy is 
directed. For it is often the case that no mis-
empathising occurs with respect to the therapist, and 
that the mis-empathising is entirely directed to the 
notional possibility of an anticipated future 
relationship that has not yet begun. Yet, such a 
possible relationship is anticipated as being fear-
inducing or otherwise neglectful, for instance, in an 
indirect relation to the influence of the past, from the 
personal history of the client. Most generally, what is 
called transference is an incorrect donation of 
empathic sense to anyone, leading to repetitive 
psychological and intersubjective problems. Let us 
consider its component parts via the concept of 
intentionality. 
 
Transference is mis-empathy, heavy with the 
influence of anticipation that the future will be like 
the past. The fear is that actual, or potentially actual, 
people will arise, who will be similar to traumatic or 
problematic people from the past. The phenomenon is 
clearly recognisable in the survivors of sexual and 
physical abuse. It is temporally founded and, when 
attended to as a conscious phenomenon, such 
anticipations may not appear at all in relation to the 
therapist. This is particularly the case when the 
therapeutic relationship is set up in such a way that a 
focus on clear aims is maintained, and when the roles 
of therapist and client are clearly defined. If therapists 
do not encourage clients to make guesses about them 
and do not permit lengthy silences in sessions, then a 
difficult job is not made into a harder one. On the 
contrary, it is quite possible to enable grossly abused 
clients to take part in co-operative and secure 
therapeutic relationships. 
 
What is called “transference” is an anticipatory mis-
empathising about specific or non-specific others. It 
is imprecisely and cumulatively related to the past. 
Sometimes, it may not be at all related to any specific 
occurrence between the client and any specific other. 
It may have a tenuous link to a non-specific situation 
such as generally growing up in a family and 
neighbourhood. It is thus no wonder that clients 
cannot relate their feelings or mode of relating to any 
one specific incident: There is none. The lack of 
specificity with respect to any single past situation 
highlights the anticipatory and defensive anxiety in 
relation to a creatively anticipated problematic that is 
not actual and only ‘hypothetical’ in relation to 
current and future relationships that clients may have. 
The psychological function of this defence is creating 
a problem and then trying to avoid it or solve it in 
different ways. 
 
Consequently, what is referred to as transference is 
better identified as a complex total of conscious 
emotions, retained influence and anticipation, loosely 
related to past actuality and loosely related towards 
the non-actuality of the future. When it interferes 
with current relationships, it can be interpreted from 
the safety-seeking that does appear in the here and 
now. These emotions, beliefs and automatic 
influences are conscious and capable of description. 
Such emotions are only descriptively unconscious 
when they are not current. The inaccuracy is a 
socially learned experience related to prolonged 
experiences such as prior attacks, betrayals, bullying 
or relationship breakdown. What happens is that layer 
upon layer of empathic experiences build up across 
the lifespan. As such, the types of experience called 
attachment, internal working models, object relations, 
schema and suchlike refer to the same type of 
experience: that of the ability to understand others 
and their intentions in relatively accurate or 
inaccurate ways. 
 
How Intentionality Helps Explain Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder and its Treatment 
 
Rather than veer off into the abstract or the fine detail 
of what Edmund Husserl really meant, let us now go 
straight to how intentionality has worth in identifying 
forms of psychological problems. Let us take the case 
of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Usually, 
OCD is classified according to the type of compulsive 
behaviour that follows the obsessional worry about 
and excessive focusing on specific objects. The 
outcome of this way of thinking about OCD is seeing 
it as counting, checking, orderliness, cleaning or 
hoarding, for instance. However, this says nothing 
about the forms of intentionality involved. My 
practice with people with OCD leads me to conclude 
that there are at least three sorts of this problem when 
the types of intentionality involved are taken into 
account. This information is gained by directly asking 
clients about the order of experiences they have, 
rather than assuming that all forms of OCD are the 
same. In brief, there are at least three different types 
of OCD, distinguished in terms of the intentionalities 
involved, as described below: 
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1. Visual imagination predominates in causing 
anxiety that leads to repetitive behaviour. This 
may include visual imaginings contrary to 
perception, plus visualisation of the catastrophic 
consequences of the imagining (see Figure 1). 
 
2. Explicit beliefs in language are repeated in 
internal dialogue as worry that causes anxiety that 
leads to the repetitive behaviour. This may also 
include the production of future imaginings of 
personal catastrophe and responsibility that are 
driven by worry (see Figure 2). 
 
3. A habitual form of conditioned anxiety exists with 
repetitive behaviour but without internal dialogue 
and without visual imagination of problems and 
catastrophes. Even on reflection, clients report no 
other intentional experiences and have no 
rationale or explanation for the compulsive 
behaviour (see Figure 3). 
 
Before going into the details of the above, a brief note 
needs to be made about the behaviour therapy 
interpretation of this same situation. The behavioural 
interpretations of classical conditioning and operant 
conditioning (Walker, 1984, 1987) concur overall 
with the phenomenological interpretation of the 
intentionalities involved. The difference, however, is 
that the phenomenological interpretation goes a great 
deal further in specifying the order and detail of what 
happens for clients. Indeed, close questioning of 
clients supports the one-person interpretations that 
classical and operant conditioning are genuine 
phenomena. But the explanatory framework becomes 
explicitly more cognitive and affective when the fine 
detail of the intentional events is uncovered by 
inquiring into the specific elements of the experiences 
for each client.  
 
One major difference between behaviourism and 
phenomenology is that, when intentionality is taken 
seriously, it is clear that there are differences about 
what actually constitutes the repetitive experience of 
OCD for a single client, and in how hermeneutic 
ideas are taken to the experiences of a client to make 
sense of them. For phenomenology, it is clear that a 
hermeneutic and explanatory process is at stake, in so 
far as certain portions of the experiences of clients are 
highlighted as being relevant while others are 
discounted.  
 
What appears for explanation is what clients mention 
and what emerges through discussion in sessions. 
This is not the same as knowing with absolute 
certainty what is causing the OCD, for there may be 
genetic factors that precipitate this type of anxiety 
disorder. Accordingly, the obsessive objects that 
‘demand’ compulsive behaviour may have been 
adopted in an arbitrary fashion. It might be the case 
that there are other sources of anxiety or unbearable 
feeling in a client’s life. OCD could act as a means of 
controlling these negative feelings. Let us look at the 
three types of OCD and their treatment in a way that 
shows the detail of intentionality as a kind of go-
between for understanding the problems and 
preparing for a self-help therapy. 
 
Firstly, there is the situation where a client has a 
number of OCD behaviours that have the specific 
intentional form shown in Figure 1. Let us take a 
concrete example of someone who checks taps to 
make sure that they are off, despite the taps actually 
being off already. The situation is one where there are 
clear perceptions that there is no water coming out of 
the tap and that, visibly, the tap is not dripping and 
the plug is out. Yet the client visualises water gushing 
out of the tap and anticipates that there will be a 
flood, with water throughout her house leading to 
electrical fires and her home burnt down, leaving her 
homeless. Before therapy, she checks both her 
bathroom and kitchen taps up to twenty or more times 
a day, for up to 15 minutes at a time. Whilst 
checking, she manages to break the washers inside 
the tap and that makes the water-sealing capability of 
the tap poor, so that the taps begin to leak rather than 
maintain their integrity when closed. Consequently, a 
plumber has to be called several times a year to stop 
the taps leaking, because the metal assemblies have 
become damaged.  
 
Behaviourally, only two composite intentionalities are 
occurring. There is classical conditioning between the 
tap and anxiety. The anxiety is diminished by the 
checking behaviour that brings relief from the 
anxiety. Regarding the behavioural interpretation, the 
operant conditioning supports classical conditioning. 
The behavioural answer to this problem is to reduce 
checking and endure the anxiety produced, until the 
anxiety diminishes. The learning is to discover that it 
is possible to bear the anxiety itself and that the 
anxiety cannot remain at high levels. 
 
Therapists can ask open questions around the 
experiences of clients and so capture what happens 
for each client. On closer inspection, what happens 
for this client is that her visual imagination plays a 
role in producing a number of images of flooding and 
fire in her home. These are contrary to the clear 
perception that the plug is out of the washbasin and 
the kitchen sink. Yet the images that come 
involuntarily, non-egoically, are those concerning 
water pouring out of the taps full blast, the sink 
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overflowing and flooding throughout her home that 
will lead to fires in her household electrical 
equipment. As a consequence, she prefers to use only 
one tap in the house and to fill numerous large pans 
with water in order to touch the taps as infrequently 
as possible.  
 
Visual imagining of an 
object contrary to 
perception 
  
↓         ↑  CLASSICAL CONDITIONING
Anxiety produced by belief 
in the imagined object   
↓   
Avoidance of anxiety 
through action → OCD type 1 
↓         ↑   
Temporary relief provided 






Given that the anxiety and avoidance are, in this case, 
mediated through her visual imagination, her therapist 
suggests that she could imagine a number of antidotes 
to compete with the imagining of taps pouring water, 
flooding and fire. She is encouraged to visually 
perceive what her taps look like when they are off. 
She is encouraged to experiment with what happens 
when she imagines calming and enjoyable visual 
scenes. She is requested to reduce the amount of time 
that she spends checking her taps from 15 minutes, in 
successive steps. In the intentional formulation, the 
awareness of what intentionality is and does is more 
detailed than the standard cognitive behavioural way 
of providing the self-help treatment of breaking the 
conditioning involved. 
 
Figure 2 shows an intentional formulation of what 
happens in another discrete form of OCD. In this 
type, the driving force is internal dialogue in the form 
of questions that a male client asks himself. He 
answers his own questions with catastrophic answers. 
In this case, the problem concerns the fear that, whilst 
driving his car, he may inadvertently have knocked 
somebody over and killed or injured a pedestrian. The 
anxiety produced by this thought leads to him driving 
back to re-inspect the piece of road that he had earlier 
crossed. He drives back across the piece of road as 
slowly as possible, looking all around to see if he has 
killed anybody. When he gets home he is still agitated 
because of the possibility that he might have killed 
somebody. Secondary to the internal dialogue driven 
by the belief that he is liable to kill people are his 
intentional connections to the perceptual events of 
driving and then to the possible consequences of what 
would happen if he were to kill somebody. Because 
of this line of explicit internal dialogue, he imagines 
appearing in court and feels strong shame in relation 
to this. 
 
Internal dialogue about 
an object contrary to 
perception 
  
↓         ↑  CLASSICAL CONDITIONING 
Anxiety produced by 
internal dialogue   
↓   
Avoidance of anxiety 
through action → OCD type 2 
↓         ↑   
Temporary relief 






In response to questioning in therapy, the client 
becomes worried that he might have injured or killed 
somebody at specific places such as busy parts of his 
hometown, pedestrian crossings and speed bumps in 
the road. At a pedestrian crossing he has no audition 
or sight of having hit somebody with his car. But this 
absence of a large audible impact, the absence of 
seeing someone being near his car, and the lack of a 
physical impact on his car, are insufficient evidence 
for him. He tells himself that he has to drive back and 
inspect the pedestrian crossing that he has already 
navigated safely. Sometimes one inspection is not 
enough. He tells himself what would happen to him, 
his wife, his colleagues and his children, were he to 
appear on charges of manslaughter and leaving the 
scene of an accident, and what would befall him after 
being prosecuted on these charges. These situations 
he can anticipate vividly: they would bring financial 
ruin on his family and colleagues and he would be 
entirely to blame.   
 
The problem is that this gentleman may well have 
conditioned himself into having this problem. Again, 
the simple behavioural view is that he should not 
drive back, no matter how he feels or what he thinks 
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in internal dialogue, or what he anticipates may 
happen. But the behavioural understanding in itself is 
a blunt instrument. The more nuanced understanding 
of the intentionalities present is that interpreted 
implicit beliefs and explicitly held beliefs drive the 
worry in his internal speech that produces the anxiety, 
and that the action of returning and checking only 
affords short-term relief in each instance. Clearly, 
there is a lack of connection between the evidence 
that he is a safe driver who has never knocked 
anybody down, and his linguistically-expressed 
worries that that he is a danger to the public and 
potentially irresponsible towards the people whom he 
cares about most. Treatment for him was to pay more 
attention to the evidence that he is a good driver and 
to set his worries aside and drive on without 
returning. 
 
Figure 3, lastly, refers to a situation where OCD 
behaviours exist with little or no conscious awareness 
as to how the person feels and what he or she thinks, 
or what may be going on in his or her life in general. 
Perhaps because of many years of repetition and lack 
of reflection, such clients have neither rationale nor 
understanding of any sort concerning their 
compulsive behaviour. Perhaps the thoughts are as 
meagre as “I should be checking”, followed by hours 
of physically painful and mentally exhausting 
checking. In this latter case, the intentionalities are 
not available to the ability of clients to reflect on their 
own experiences. Accordingly, the intentional 
formulation of the obsessions and compulsions 
becomes anxiety and the repeated behaviour as one 
item, leading to temporary relief as the reward of 
operant conditioning. Part of treatment might be to 
explore the horizon of the client’s life to find out if 
there are other worries that might bring some 
understanding to the psychological function of the 
OCD: as a block against other worries and emotions, 
perhaps. Behavioural principles could be applied to 
reduce anxiety once the overall intentional balance in 
the client’s life is understood. 
 
 
Conditioned anxiety and 
repetitive behaviour   
↓          ↑   
Temporary relief 







A Note on Cognitive Behavioural Formulation 
 
This final section offers some critical comments on 
the theoretical stance of cognitive behavioural 
therapy from the intentional viewpoint. In cognitive 
behavioural therapy, there is an emphasis on 
formulation as a way to interpret and create a mutual 
understanding of psychological problems and hence 
provide therapy. There are many formulations extant 
for a number of problems and a whole literature on 
how to formulate and treat. Clearly, it is not possible 
to address the fine detail of the literature here. The 
problem with the cognitive behavioural approach is 
that it is not intellectually clear about what it is doing 
and how it is doing its work. Also, what happens is 
that monolithic assumptions are made about 
psychological causes in general, possibly without 
attention to the client at all. Such an attention could 
only promote theory ‘over’ the experience of clients 
and would be entirely non-phenomenological. 
 
In passing, however, it is noted that the overall 
tendency in the cognitive behavioural literature is to 
sketch diagrams of cause and effect without any self-
reflexive explanation of how the diagrams have been 
created. As there is no accompanying theory of mind, 
the explanations arise out of nowhere. A thumbnail 
sketch of some of the current cognitive behavioural 
ideas regarding the maintenance of psychological 
problems will now be provided.  
 
Anorexia is dealt with in terms of egoic factors such 
as self worth and self-control, in relation to the 
emotional effects of mis-empathised others 
anticipated as a result of the failure of self-control due 
to ‘over-eating’ (Fairburn, Shafran & Cooper, 1998, 
pp. 5-6). In this model, however, the thoughts and 
feelings of others are downplayed. The model of 
bulimia provided by Clark and Fairburn (1997, p. 
212) is more accurate, but does not make explicit the 
role of vomiting and laxative abuse as operant 
conditioning. Nor does it highlight the emotional 
changes before and after binge-eating and vomiting 
that would be central to a phenomenological 
understanding. Secondly, the anticipated empathy of 
others is omitted, providing an excessive focus on 
self with the senses of others implied rather than 
explicit. 
 
Generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) or worry has 
been portrayed in two ways. The first, by Dugas et al. 
(1998, p. 216), refers to relevant factors but notes the 
role of belief as creating anxiety, when it is likely that 
anxiety could be a direct consequence of self-talk, 
visual imagining or anticipation. Wells (1997, p. 204) 
has created a much more complex account that 
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distinguishes between levels of self-reflection but has 
no relation to any hermeneutic factors or values in 
terms of what might make something an important 
factor for worry in the first place.  
 
OCD and health anxiety are both similar to worry. 
OCD is given a fair account by Salkovskis (1985, p. 
578), but the role of temporary relief is downplayed. 
The view of Wells (1997, p. 242) on OCD is that 
beliefs are explicit and the topic of hermeneutics is 
implicit, but the role of temporary relief is omitted 
altogether. Health anxiety is postulated as being due 
to the centrality of belief, but with no mention of 
what beliefs are or how they are re-evaluated through 
therapy (Clark & Fairburn, 1997, p. 320). Also, the 
role of temporary relief is omitted by Clark and 
Fairburn. The view of health anxiety by Wells takes a 
developmental or historical element into account in 
explaining classical conditioning, but does not make 
explicit the intentionalities present in the catastrophic 
thoughts that are at the heart of creating the anxiety 
actually felt (1997, p. 135). Again this model omits 
the role of operant conditioning. 
 
Of the remaining noteworthy models, panic episodes 
are given fair treatment by Clark and Fairburn (1997, 
p. 138), but the precise forms of the intentionalities 
that might occur are not mentioned. The 
understanding of panic disorder offered by Wells 
(1997, p. 102) is one that mentions a complex 
intentional state of affairs that provides the anxiety 
(but omits relief). Classical conditioning mentions 
body sensation, but omits coverage of how the body 
is catastrophically interpreted. Post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) is represented in terms of the 
findings of cognitive psychology (Brewin, 2001, p. 
382). The treatment given PTSD by Ehlers and Clark 
indicates that it is more complex and gives a place for 
the idiosyncratic thoughts and experiences of the 
meaning of the trauma for its survivors (2000, p. 
321). A model of intimate relationships is provided 
by Tarrier, Wells and Haddock (1998, p. 406) in such 
a way as to omit any mention of attachment theory 
and research on intimate relationships between adults. 
Finally, social phobia is referred to without mention 
of the attachment literature, and yet it correctly 
understands that the apperception of self by self is the 
central event, although it does not state how the self 
comes to treat itself in any specific way (Clark & 
Fairburn, 1997, p. 141). The picture of social phobia 
in Wells (1997, p. 169) is that a number of intentional 
processes coincide, but the role of the relief provided 
by social avoidance is downplayed. 
 
What the above all share is the assumption that they 
know how consciousness works. Yet none of the 
papers include any mention of qualitative research on 
these experiences or make reference to a theory of 
intentionality. It is the clear assumption of cognitive 
behavioural theory that the intentionality of 
consciousness is central to the production and 
maintenance of psychological problems. Yet its 
interventions create changes in the amount and 
quality of attention to objects of various kinds. When 
the type of intentionality is changed, then the sense 
experienced also changes. Changing from one object 
to another also provides new experiential senses. 
Specifically, what the cognitive behavioural approach 
assumes (like any non-philosophical model of therapy 
or psychology) is that beliefs interpret ontologically. 
What is believed to exist does exist: hence the 
usefulness of the idea of intentionality in the first 
place. Felt emotions exist in relation to what is 
believed to be the case in the past, current moment or 
future. Without the conceptual ability to compare and 
contrast the different manners of intentionality 
towards different senses of the same object of 
attention, there can be no theory that gets close to 
human experience. The problems of clients and 
inaccurate theory are then remarkably similar. The 
over-fixation on belief and its use in regions where it 
is inapplicable produce:  (1) inaccurate interpretations 
of the evidence of both the part and the whole,  and 
(2) inaccurate interpretations of the proper regions of 
evidence. Both false understandings prevent accurate 
actions because the more accurate experiences cannot 




A full account of intentionality in classical Husserlian 
phenomenology has not been provided in this paper. 
Husserl’s search for ontological a priori concerned 
sorting less dependent superficialities or parts from 
more independent wholes (The Third Logical 
Investigation, 1901/1970). Applying phenomenology 
is taking the ideas and methods for concluding on a 
priori (such as the intentionality of consciousness) to 
a chosen area and working there constructively. What 
this means is that classical Husserlian 
phenomenology was a practice for theorising, but not 
as an end in itself. Husserl’s view was of a 
meaningful whole of the self as meaningful and 
social. The self, for instance, is an experiential whole 
that runs across the traditional categories of what is 
intrapersonal and interpersonal, social, systemic, and 
so on. The raw data for Husserl’s phenomenology is 
lived experience. Consequently, psychopathology and 
its treatment are both experientially influence-able. 
The concept of intentionality is a gateway to 
understanding psychological existence: something 
that natural psychological science cannot grasp. In 
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brief, a certain type of pragmatism exists between 
genuine understanding and effective action. 
Purposeful conscious actions of the ego can be 
attained through explicit and implicit aims and beliefs 
that consistently bring about the wanted and 
anticipated outcomes.
 
About the Author 
 
Ian Rory Owen was born with the Dutch family name van Loo in Wellington, New 
Zealand in 1960. He was awarded his Bachelor of Technology degree in Mechanical 
Engineering in 1982 and worked briefly as a technical journalist and in business during 
the 1980s before commencing his training in counselling, hypnotherapy and 
psychotherapy. He began his therapeutic career in 1987, gaining a Master’s degree in 
counselling and psychotherapy from Regent’s College, London, in 1991, and a PhD in 
2005. He became a Graduate Member of the British Psychological Society in 1999 and a 
UKCP registered psychotherapist in 1995. As a Senior Lecturer in Counselling 
Psychology, he led the MA/MSc course in Counselling at the University of 
Wolverhampton until 2001. Since 2001 he has worked for Leeds Mental Health Trust, 
where he is currently a Principal Integrative Psychotherapist, providing individual brief 
therapy for adults. He is the author of more than 50 papers and three books in the area of 





Brewin, C. R. (2001). A cognitive neuroscience account of posttraumatic stress disorder and its treatment. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 39, 373-393. 
 
Clark, D. M., & Fairburn, C. G. (Eds.) (1997). Science and practice of cognitive behaviour therapy. Oxford: OUP. 
 
Dugas, M. J., Gagnon, F., Ladouceur, R., & Freeston, M. H. (1998). Generalised anxiety disorder: A preliminary test 
of a conceptual model. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 36, 215-226. 
 
Ehlers, A., & Clark, D. M. (2000). A cognitive model of posttraumatic stress disorder. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 38, 319-345. 
 
Ellenberger, H. F. (1970). The discovery of the unconscious: The history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry. New 
York: Basic Books.  
 
Fairburn, C. G., Shafran, R., & Cooper, Z. (1998). A cognitive behavioural theory of anorexia nervosa. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 37, 1-13. 
 
Freud, S. (1958). Remembering, repeating and working-through. In S. Freud, The standard edition of the complete 
psychological works of Sigmund Freud: Vol. 12 (J. Strachey, Ed. & Trans.) (pp. 147-156). London: Hogarth. 
(Original work published 1914) 
 
Freud, S. (1964). An outline of psycho-analysis. In S. Freud, The standard edition of the complete psychological 
works of Sigmund Freud: Vol. 23 (J. Strachey, Ed. & Trans.) (pp. 144-207). London: Hogarth. (Original work 
published 1940) 
 
Husserl, E. (1970). The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology (D. Carr, Trans.). Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press. (Original work published 1936) 
 
Husserl, E. (1970). Logical investigations (Vols. 1 & 2) (J. N. Findlay, Trans.). London: RKP. (Original work 
published 1900 & 1901) 
 
Husserl, E. (1973). Experience and judgement: Investigations in a genealogy of logic (J. S. Churchill & K. Americs, 
Trans.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press. (Original work published 1939) 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 7, Edition 1 May 2007  Page 11 of 11 
 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of Rhodes University in South Africa and Edith Cowan University in Australia. This document is subject to 
copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any medium (print, electronic or otherwise) without the express permission of the 
publishers. 
 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
 
Husserl, E. (1977). Cartesian meditations: An introduction to phenomenology (D. Cairns, Trans.). The Hague: 
Nijhoff. (Original work published 1931) 
 
Husserl, E. (1982). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy: First book (F. 
Kersten, Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Original work published 1913) 
 
Husserl, E. (1997). The Amsterdam lectures [on] phenomenological psychology. In T. Sheehan & R. E. Palmer (Eds. 
& Trans.), Psychological and transcendental phenomenology and the confrontation with Heidegger (1927-
1931) (pp. 213-253). Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Original work published 1928) 
 
Kern, I. (1977). The three ways to the transcendental phenomenological reduction in the philosophy of Edmund 
Husserl. In F. A. Elliston & P. McCormack (Eds.), Husserl: Expositions and appraisals (pp. 126-149). Notre 
Dame: Notre Dame University Press. 
 
Kern, I. (1986). Trinity: Theological reflections of a phenomenologist. In S. W. Laycock & J. G. Hart (Eds.), Essays 
in phenomenological theology (pp. 23-37). Albany: SUNY. 
 
Kern, I. (1988). The structure of consciousness according to Xuanzang. Journal of the British Society for 
Phenomenology, 19, 282-295.  
 
Kern, I., & Marbach, E. (2001). Understanding the representational mind: A prerequisite for intersubjectivity proper.  
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, 69-82. 
 
Marbach, E. (1988). How to study consciousness phenomenologically or quite a lot comes to mind. Journal of the 
British Society for Phenomenology, 19, 252-268. 
 
Marbach, E. (1993). Mental representation and consciousness: Towards a phenomenological theory of 
representation and reference. Norwell: Kluwer. 
 
Marbach, E. (2005). On bringing consciousness into the house of science - with the help of Husserlian 
phenomenology. Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, 10, 145-162. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of perception (C. Smith, Trans.). London: Routledge. (Original work 
published 1945)  
 
Owen, I. R. (2006). Psychotherapy and phenomenology: On Freud, Husserl and Heidegger. Lincoln: iUniverse. 
 
Rorer, L. G. (1991). Some myths of science in psychology. In D. Cicchetti & W. M. Grove (Eds.), Thinking clearly 
about psychology: Vol. 1 (pp. 61-87). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
  
Salkovskis, P. M. (1985). Obsessional-compulsive problems: A cognitive-behavioural analysis. Behaviour Research 
and Therapy, 23, 571-583. 
 
Tarrier, N., Wells, A., & Haddock, G. (1998). Treating complex cases: The cognitive behavioural therapy approach. 
Chichester: Wiley. 
 
Walker, S. F. (1984). Learning theory and behaviour modification. London: Methuen. 
 
Walker, S. F. (1987). Animal learning theory: An introduction. London: R&KP. 
 
Wells, A. (1997). Cognitive therapy of anxiety disorders: A practice manual and conceptual guide. Chichester: 
Wiley. 
 
Zahavi, D. (2003). Husserl’s phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
______________________ 
